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HOW THE PICKERS PICK: FINDING A SET OF
BEST PRACTICES FOR JUDICIAL
NOMINATING COMMISSIONS
Rachel Paine Caufield, Ph.D.*
States and municipalities still seek to build upon and improve
the judicial selection methods used by prior generations.  Like
most institutional arrangements that are responsive to the needs
of society, judicial selection demands an on-going process that
borrows and profits from the past, meets the needs of the pre-
sent and remains flexible to permit future adaptation.1
At the core of any system of justice is the judge, the arbiter of
society’s conflicts.  While good judges cannot ensure a just society,
arguing that the quality of the judiciary is unrelated to the quality
of justice proves difficult.2  Unqualified or unsuitable judges will
lead to capricious justice, where inconsistency, inequality, and arbi-
trariness undermine the force of law.  Arbitrary decisions degrade
the meaning and purpose of democratic government and are anath-
ema to the rule of law.3  The debate over methods of judicial selec-
tion reflects, at its heart, a debate about the value of law as a
governing force.  The goal is to produce a judiciary worthy of the
respect and obedience of the community, thereby promoting con-
sistency, stability, and fairness.  There is a continuing need to
reevaluate and assess methods of judicial selection to ensure a
qualified bench and advance the cause of justice.
Traditionally, the debate over methods of judicial selection has
centered primarily on the competing ideals of judicial indepen-
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1. ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELEC-
TION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 2 (1974).
2. Id. at 1.
3. ANDREW ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 15-20 (2000).
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dence and judicial accountability.  An independent judiciary, free
from political constraints that impede fair and impartial decision-
making, ensures that judges’ decisions will reflect the case facts and
the law.  Every citizen benefits from a judicial system that accu-
rately and effectively addresses conflicts in a neutral forum.  Un-
like officials in the legislative and executive branches, who are
meant to be the representatives of the people, judges occupy a
unique position in that they are responsible to the law.  A purely
independent judiciary, subject to no limits or checks on its author-
ity, however, may run afoul of the law without any serious conse-
quences.4  Therefore, judicial accountability is both necessary and
desirable to provide checks on the powers of the judge.5  Finding
an appropriate balance is (for obvious reasons) difficult.  Judges
need decisional independence if they are to be faithful to the law,
yet constitutional government demands institutional accountabil-
ity.6  Constitutional government depends on a judiciary populated
with judges who not only understand the law, but will apply the law
fairly and faithfully.
These conflicting goals form the backdrop for the ongoing de-
bate over how to best select judges.  Since the American Revolu-
tionary War, there have been heated debates about the best
methods for state judicial selection.  In the early 20th century, the
“merit selection” plan was proposed.7  This method was thought to
balance the competing ideals of independence and accountability
by combining features of appointment and popular election.8  From
1940 until 2000, the “merit selection” plan was adopted in some
form by thirty-two states and the District of Columbia,9 the most
4. Walter Berns, The Least Dangerous Branch, But Only If . . ., in THE JUDICI-
ARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 1, 1 (Leonard J. Theberge ed., 1979).
5. Id. at 1-3.
6. Thomas R. Phillips, Keynote Address, Electoral Accountability and Judicial
Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 138 (2003).
7. MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFON, JUDICIAL SELEC-
TION: THE CROSS-EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 213 (1988);
Susan J. Carbon, Retention Elections in the United States, 64 JUDICATURE 210, 213
(1980).
8. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 7, at 137-38.
9. See generally AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT
STATUS (2003), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialMeritCharts.pdf (last visited
Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION].  On January 29, 2007, Gov-
ernor Ted Strickland of Ohio formally announced the formation of a nominating com-
mission that will be used to screen applicants for vacancy appointments.  Jon Craig &
Dan Horn, Strickland Sets Up Panel to Pick Judges, THE ENQUIRER, Jan. 30, 2007,
available at http://news.cincinnati.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070130/NEWS01/
701300342/-1/CINCI.  The new Ohio nominating commission is not, however, opera-
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ106.txt unknown Seq: 3  5-APR-07 7:35
2007] HOW THE PICKERS PICK 165
prominent judicial reform movement since the Jacksonian era.
“Merit selection” systems use a bipartisan nominating commission
made up of lawyers and laypersons that makes recommendations
to the appointing authority.10  Today, as we reassess appointive
methods of selection, a closer examination of existing judicial nom-
inating commissions can provide vital insights to advance our
discussion.
To that end, the Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I provides a
brief history of judicial selection in the states, with particular atten-
tion to the development and adoption of appointive methods (in-
cluding the so-called “merit selection” method).  Part II examines
the reaction to these merit selection plans and addresses common
questions about the role and function of judicial nominating com-
missions.  The third and fourth parts detail the procedures that are
used by nominating commissions across the country.  Although
commissions vary greatly in their structure and operation, these
parts review several of the most important operating procedures
and examine the extent to which they have been adopted by judi-
cial nominating commissions.  Part V seeks to develop a set of
“best practices” that can be adopted by nominating commissions.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
At the federal level, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, re-
sponding to the abuses of King George under English rule, deter-
mined that judges should be selected by the executive, but added
the safeguard of Senate confirmation and lifetime tenure to limit
the President’s control over the judiciary.11  As Alexander Hamil-
ton wrote in THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, “the necessity of [Senate]
concurrence would have a powerful though in general, a silent op-
eration.  It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism
in the President, and would tend greatly to preventing the appoint-
tional at this time. Id.  Including Ohio, thirty-three states have set up a nominating
commission, but for the purposes of this Article, Ohio is not included. JUDICIAL
MERIT SELECTION, supra, at 3-7.
10. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 7, at 137-38.
11. The delegates’ final debate about judicial selection occurred on September 7,
1787, when they voted to approve the appointment by the President, subject to Senate
consent.  During the debate, Gouverneur Morris defended the proposed plan by say-
ing “as the President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and as the Sen-
ate was to concur, there would be security.” See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING
FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN
6 (1997).
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ment of unfit characters . . . .”12  Once appointed and confirmed,
U.S. federal judges were to be exempt from political control with
the exception of extreme circumstances that warranted impeach-
ment.  The Framers of the Constitution recognized the value of ju-
dicial independence and wanted to ensure that judges would never
be punished for specific unpopular decisions.13  To achieve that
goal, federal judges were not only granted terms for “good behav-
ior,”14 but Article III of the Constitution explicitly forbids Con-
gress and the President from lowering a judge’s salary at any point
during the judge’s service on the bench.15
At the state level, all of the thirteen original states opted to use
some form of appointment for the selection of judges.16  Eight of
the thirteen used legislative appointment, two granted the power of
judicial appointment to the governor and his council, and three
states used gubernatorial appointment, with confirmation by the
governor’s council.17  From 1776 to 1830, each of the states that
joined the union used a system of appointment for the selection of
judges.18
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
13. Alexander Hamilton explicitly recognized the danger of judges issuing deci-
sions based upon the popularity of the outcome.  He concluded that if the executive
or legislative branches had the power to appoint and reappoint judges with fixed ten-
ures, “there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance
that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws.” THE FEDERAL-
IST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
14. Hamilton made the intended connection between judicial independence and
terms of “good behavior” clear in FEDERALIST NO. 78, where he wrote that:
[t]he standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial
magistracy is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improve-
ments in the practice of government.  In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier
to the despotism of the prince: In a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to
the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.  And it is the
best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady,
upright and impartial administration of the laws. . . . [i]f then the courts of
justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited constitution against
legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument
for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so
much as this to that independent spirit in the judges, which must be essential
to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465, 469 (Alexander Hamilton).
15. U.S. CONST. art. III.
16. Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, in
JUDICIAL POLITICS: READINGS FROM JUDICATURE 50, 50-52 (Elliot E. Slotnick ed.,
2005).
17. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 8; Berkson, supra note 16, at 50-52. R
18. Of those states that entered the union between 1776 and 1830, five (Alabama,
Illinois, Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee) used legislative appointment while six (In-
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States began to move away from appointive selection methods in
the mid-1800s with the rise of Jacksonian democracy and its em-
phasis on democratic accountability, individual equality, and direct
voter participation in governmental decision-making.19  Judicial ap-
pointment had become the subject of considerable scorn, as there
was increasing resentment about the role of the upper class in the
selection of judges.20  Appointment was seen as a tool to reinforce
privilege and deny the common person of her democratic right to
popular sovereignty.21
Instead, direct elections became the preferred method to choose
judges.22  As early as 1812, Georgia passed a constitutional amend-
ment to elect lower state court judges.23  In 1816, when Indiana
became a state, its constitution specified that associate judges of
the circuit court were to be elected.24  But the movement toward
judicial elections did not make significant progress until the 1830s
and 1840s.  Mississippi was the first state to elect all of its judges
when it adopted the practice in 1832.25  In 1836, Michigan elected
its trial court judges for the first time.26  New York’s constitutional
convention in 1846 amended the state constitution and changed
from appointment to popular election for all of its judges, starting a
tidal wave of reform.27  By the Civil War, twenty-four of the thirty-
diana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, and Vermont) relied on the governor to
appoint judges, with either legislative confirmation or approval by a legislative coun-
cil. See CHARLES SHELDON & LINDA MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUIT-
MENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 3 (1997).
19. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 9-10; SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 18,
at 4; Berkson, supra note 16, at 50.
20. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 18, at 4; Russell D. Niles, The Popular Elec-
tion of Judges in Historical Perspective, in THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 524, 524 (Nov. 1966).
21. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 18, at 4; VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 7,
at 89; Berkson, supra note 16, at 50.
22. Elections were preferred not only by voters who wanted greater levels of con-
trol over judges, but by judges who believed that direct popular election would create
a separate constituency for the judicial branch, thereby encouraging judicial indepen-
dence from the legislative and executive branches.  See SHELDON & MAULE, supra
note 18, at 4; Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Ac-
countability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345, 347.
23. Berkson, supra note 16, at 50.
24. Id.
25. When it joined the union, Mississippi used legislative appointment with tenure
for “good behavior.”  In 1832, the state changed to a system of direct election and
limited judges’ terms to six years. See SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 18, at 4; see
also ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 9.
26. Berkson, supra note 16, at 50.
27. Id. at 50; ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 9.
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four states had elected judiciaries.28  In a single year, 1850, seven
states altered their systems of judicial selection to allow for popular
election of judges.29  For the next 100 years, every state that en-
tered the union had an elected judiciary.30
Despite the initial concern that appointive selection methods
were easily controlled by those with money and power, direct pop-
ular elections did not fare much better.  By the latter part of the
18th century, the nation underwent significant changes, including
massive industrialization and urbanization.  In the largest cities,
party machines came to dominate political processes, including the
election of judges.31  In New York City, Tammany Hall was free to
hand-pick judicial candidates.32  Combined with the fact that most
voters were unfamiliar with judicial candidates, the machine was
virtually unfettered in its ability to get those candidates favored by
the local political organization elected to the bench.33  As a result,
judges were seen as corrupt, unethical, unqualified, and incompe-
tent.34  As early as 1853, delegates at the Massachusetts Constitu-
tional Convention rejected a proposal to switch to popular
elections and one delegate opined that elections had “fallen hope-
lessly into the great cistern” and that judges were now a part of the
“political mill.”35  In 1873, New York considered a proposal to re-
turn to appointment—a proposal that gained considerable public
support.36
Given widespread dissatisfaction with partisan judicial elections
that were controlled by urban party machines and declining public
confidence in the judiciary, efforts were made to reform the electo-
ral process and remove political parties from judicial selection
processes.  The most widely accepted method to achieve this was
through the use of nonpartisan elections, whereby judicial candi-
dates’ names would appear on the ballot without any party identifi-
cation.  Nonpartisan elections were first used in Cook County,
Illinois (Chicago) in 1873.37  Although no statute dictated the use
of nonpartisan ballots, the judges themselves decided to run with-
28. Berkson, supra note 16, at 50.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 9-10.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Berkson, supra note 16, at 50; see also SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 18, at 5.
35. Niles, supra note 20, at 528 n.46.
36. See id. at 535.
37. Berkson, supra note 16, at 50.
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out party identification.38  Cook County continued to use nonparti-
san elections in 1885 and 1893, although it eventually returned to
partisan elections.39  By 1927, twelve states used nonpartisan elec-
tions.40  Almost as soon as states started adopting nonpartisan elec-
tions, however, problems arose.  Several states, including Iowa,
Kansas, and Pennsylvania, tried nonpartisan elections and quickly
rejected them because, absent party labels, voters were unable to
make informed decisions.41
As a result of the states’ experiences with elected judiciaries, a
“clarion call for a frontal attack on the popular election of judges
was sounded” in the early 20th century.42  Roscoe Pound, a young
law professor at the University of Nebraska, spoke before the
newly formed American Bar Association, claiming that “putting
courts into politics, and compelling judges to become politicians in
many jurisdictions [had] almost destroyed the traditional respect
for the bench.”43  In 1913, William Howard Taft, the former presi-
dent and future Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, spoke
before the American Bar Association and continued Pound’s at-
tack on judicial elections.  Taft found judicial campaigns “disgrace-
ful,” because judicial candidates would have to campaign based
upon claims that their decisions would favor a particular class of
voters.44
Also in 1913, the American Judicature Society opened its doors.
One of the organization’s co-founders and its first Director of Re-
search was Albert M. Kales, a law professor at Northwestern Uni-
versity.  Kales was particularly devoted to the problem of judicial
selection and sought to find a method of selection that would bal-
ance the need for judicial independence and the desire for public
control.  While appointive systems were better able to ensure in-
formed decisions about who should become a judge, elections were
38. Id.
39. Id.  Formally, Illinois used a system of partisan elections.  Judges agreed to not
include party affiliation in the elections of 1873-1893.  Subsequent candidates did not
adhere to this practice, and Illinois returned to partisan elections.
40. Id.; see also SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 18, at 6.
41. Berkson, supra note 16, at 50-51.
42. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 10.
43. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration
of Justice, 20 AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 178, 186 (1937) (reprinting Pound’s address
delivered in 1906 to the American Bar Association).
44. Taft went on to say that the system was “so shocking and so out of keeping
with the fixedness of moral principles . . . [that it ought to be] condemned.”  Berkson,
supra note 16, at 51 (quoting William Howard Taft, The Selection and Tenure of
Judges, 38 REP. A.B.A 418 (1913)); see also ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 10-11.
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best suited to provide safeguards and guarantee accountability.45
Kales proposed a new method of selection that would combine ap-
pointment and election, but with added elements that he believed
would strengthen the process as a whole.46
Under his proposed method, the “Kales Plan,” an elected Chief
Justice would fill judicial vacancies by appointing someone from a
list that was submitted by a judicial nominating commission.47  The
judicial nominating commission was to be nonpartisan, and was
charged with the responsibility of screening applicants and recom-
mending only those who were most qualified for the position.48
After the Chief Justice appointed a new judge, the judge would
serve for a predetermined amount of time and would then face the
voters in regular retention elections.  Voters would decide whether
the judge would remain on the bench in an uncontested, nonparti-
san referendum vote.  If a judge was rejected in a retention elec-
tion, the Chief Justice would then appoint another judge from a list
prepared by the judicial nominating commission.49  Harold Laski, a
political scientist in England, suggested a variation on the Kales
Plan in 1926, whereby the governor would be the appointing au-
thority rather than the Chief Justice.50  Taken together, this new
approach was called the “Kales-Laski Plan.”
The proposal attracted no active support until 1937 when the
American Bar Association endorsed a “merit selection” plan simi-
lar to the Kales-Laski Plan.51  Then, in 1940, Missouri became the
first state to adopt the Kales-Laski Plan when it amended the state
constitution to include a merit selection plan to choose judges for
the Missouri Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, and the Circuit
and Probate Courts in the city of St. Louis and Jackson County.52
It wasn’t until the 1950s and 1960s that the so-called “Missouri
Plan”53 gradually gained popularity.  In the 1950s, three states
45. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 11.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 18, at 6.
49. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 11.
50. Id.
51. Id.; Berkson, supra note 16, at 51.
52. Because the plan was first adopted by Missouri, it is frequently referred to as
the “Missouri Plan.” ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 11; Berkson, supra note 16,
at 51; see also JACK L. CAMPBELL ET AL., EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MISSOURI NON-
PARTISAN COURT PLAN 11-12 (2005), http://www.mobar.org/courts/commission_re-
port.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
53. “Merit selection” is generally used to refer to the Kales-Laski Plan, although it
has been used to describe any number of variants on that initial proposal.  “The Mis-
souri Plan” is typically used to describe merit selection generally, although Missouri is
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adopted commission-based appointment systems; in the 1960s, an-
other eight states adopted such systems; and in the 1970s an addi-
tional fourteen states and the District of Columbia introduced
commission-based appointment.54
Today, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia use a
“merit selection” process with a nominating commission to choose
some or all of their judges.55  It is important to note that there is no
one merit selection system.  Rather, there are nearly as many varia-
tions on the merit selection plan as there are states that use a com-
mission-based appointment system.56  What they all share,
however, is the use of an independent (and usually bipartisan)
commission that is established to evaluate applicants for the bench
and make recommendations to the appointing authority.  The ap-
pointing authority (usually the governor) chooses one person from
the list of recommended candidates; in some cases, the appoint-
ment must be confirmed by the state legislature.  Although the
Kales Plan initially required the use of regular retention elections
where voters would decide whether a judge was retained, several
states have opted to use other methods to determine whether a
judge will remain on the bench after the initial term of office.57
technically a “hybrid system” because some state judges are appointed and some are
elected.  Here, I use “commission-based appointment system” as a broader concep-
tual term to refer to any state that has set up a judicial nominating commission to
recommend or nominate individuals for appointment by the relevant appointing au-
thority.  The remainder of the Article retains the “commission-based appointment
system” language because “merit selection” and “Missouri Plan” refer to specific vari-
ants of commission-based appointment systems.  The fact that “merit selection,”
“Missouri Plan,” and “commission-based appointment” are so frequently used inter-
changeably creates considerable confusion in the debate over judicial selection.
54. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES, APPELLATE
AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2004), http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelection
Charts.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
55. Id.
56. In addition to those states that use commission-based appointment systems for
initial appointment, some states use commission-based appointment only to fill vacan-
cies that occur on the bench. Id.
57. Id.  For example, Connecticut uses a process where the sitting judge is evalu-
ated by the commission on a noncompetitive basis, and the governor re-nominates
and the legislature re-confirms a judge for subsequent terms on the bench.  In Dela-
ware, the incumbent judge reapplies to the nominating commission and must compete
with other applicants.  The governor re-appoints and the senate re-confirms for subse-
quent terms.  New York’s two highest courts (the Court of Appeals and the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court) use the same process.  In Hawaii, judges are reap-
pointed by the Judicial Selection Commission.  Once appointed to the bench in Mas-
sachusetts, judges serve until age seventy with no retention mechanism.  Similarly, in
Rhode Island, sitting judges serve for lifetime tenure with no regular retention mecha-
nism.  Judges in New Mexico run in the next general election after appointment, in a
partisan election process.  Thereafter, they run in retention elections.  In Vermont,
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ106.txt unknown Seq: 10  5-APR-07 7:35
172 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
Commission-based appointment is founded on the premise that
a group of people divorced from the political realm can perform
the vital function of choosing independent, nonpartisan, and
nonpolitical judges better than politically motivated elected offi-
cials.58  As such, commission-based appointment systems will only
serve their function if the commission operates in a way that en-
courages fair and impartial decision-making rather than self-inter-
est or political objectives.  Understanding how commissions go
about their work can help us craft effective decision-making
processes that will, in turn, promote public confidence in the judici-
ary and guarantee fair and impartial courts.
II. THE DEBATE OVER COMMISSION-BASED APPOINTMENT
Since Missouri adopted commission-based appointment in 1940,
there has been ongoing debate about the implementation of these
systems.  First, advocates of commission-based appointment claim
that these plans produce better judges because they lessen the in-
fluence of political factors.  But many have questioned the veracity
of this claim.  Second, there has been considerable concern regard-
ing commissioners’ loyalty to those who put them on the commis-
sion.  Commission-based appointment systems depend on the
commissioners’ ability to work without being influenced by politi-
cal considerations.  If, in practice, commissioners are influenced by
the political preferences of those who put them on the commission,
the system fails to achieve its intended goal.  Third, the extent to
which the composition of the nominating commission represents
the diversity of the community and the influence of the organized
bar are frequent points of contention.  Taken together, these issues
have fueled the on-going debate about commission-based appoint-
ment.  This section briefly considers each in turn and leaves the
more nuanced discussion to other contributors.
The Quality of Judges
One of the claims made by advocates of commission-based ap-
pointment throughout the 1950s and 1960s was that elections less-
ened the quality of judges, as voters typically did not have the
expertise to effectively evaluate whether a judicial candidate would
judges selected in a merit selection system are re-appointed to six-year terms through
a vote by the general assembly. Id.
58. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, MERIT SELECTION: THE BEST WAY TO CHOOSE THE
BEST JUDGES 1 (2003), http://www.ajs.org/js/ms_descrip.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2007).
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be a good judge.59  Instead, voters were likely to vote based upon
personality, political party affiliation, name recognition, or to not
vote at all.60  By contrast, appointive systems allow those familiar
with the law and the legal community greater input in the selection
of judges.61  Commission-based appointive systems have the added
advantage of institutionalized bipartisanship.62  Therefore, as judi-
cial nominating commissions include lay persons and are bipartisan
(or nonpartisan) by design, they are thought to eliminate politi-
cally-motivated appointments and uninformed voting by the elec-
torate.63  W. W. Crowdus, one of the leading proponents of
Missouri’s adoption of commission-based appointment, empha-
sized the advantages of the proposed system in 1941:
Under the new plan, it makes no difference what a man’s
politics are before he goes on the bench—the point is that after
he once attains the bench, he can and shall be independent of
politics in the performance of his judicial duties, and he will be
free from political obligations and demands upon his time from
59. As Ashman and Alfini note, former Attorney General Herbert Brownell said
“a system based on political rewards tends to produce the ‘gray mice’ of the judicial
establishment—ordinary, likeable people of small talent.” ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra
note 1, at 71.
60. JOANNE MARTIN, MERIT SELECTION COMMISSIONS: WHAT DO THEY DO?
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THEY? 3 (A.B.A. Rep. 1993); see, e.g., Laurance M. Hyde, The
Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION
AND TENURE 47, 91 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 1967); Jack W. Peltason, The Merits and
Demerits of the Missouri Court Plan, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION
AND TENURE 95, 96 (1973).
61. See RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, JUSTICE FOR HIRE: IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 34-35 (2002),
http://www.heartland.org/pdf/10339.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter JUS-
TICE FOR HIRE].
62. Originally, advocates of the Kales-Laski Plan emphasized that the commission
was to be nonpartisan.  Over time, however, recognizing the difficulty of assembling a
group of people who will be truly “nonpartisan,” advocates have relied upon the idea
of “bipartisanship” and most commissions have specific provisions that enforce bipar-
tisanship.  Commissioners who serve on bipartisan committees are far less likely to
report that political influences affect commission decision-making. See ASHMAN &
ALFINI, supra note 1, at 78.
63. Laurance M. Hyde wrote about the Missouri Plan:
We do not claim that our plan has or ever will bring about perfection.  That
is impossible to achieve with human beings.  We do claim, not only that our
plan has a higher batting average in selecting able judges than our former
political system, but also that it affords every judge an opportunity to be a
better judge than he possibly could have been under the old system which
required him to put in much of his time campaigning for a party nomination
and for election of his party ticket; requiring him to be a politician to remain
a judge.
Hyde, supra note 60, at 94.
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political sources—it will make it unnecessary for a judge to incur
political obligation. . . .  It will cause the attention of the voters
to be focused on a judge’s record, thus making it easier to re-
move incompetent judges from office and to retain those whose
records are meritorious.64
But the claim that commission-based appointment produces the
highest quality judges is notoriously difficult to evaluate because
“quality” is so ill-defined.  Nonetheless, commissioners themselves
are confident of the quality of applicants that they recommend.65
Furthermore, given evidence that the public is wary of the influ-
ence of money and interest group pressure prevalent in many judi-
cial elections today, appointment can increase public confidence in
the quality of the judiciary.66  It is also worth noting that highly
qualified candidates may prefer commission-based appointment
because they are unwilling or unable to raise the money to run an
effective campaign in an elective system.67
Who Picks the Pickers?
The most frequently voiced concern of opponents of commis-
sion-based appointment systems is that commissioners will simply
represent the preferences of those who appointed them.  In his ini-
tial plan, Albert Kales recommended that a nominating commis-
sion be made up entirely of sitting judges.68  As a proposed change
to Kales’s initial plan, Harold Laski suggested that the nominating
process include the bar association.69  In 1931, at the annual meet-
64. Peltason, supra note 60, at 98-99 (quoting William W. Crowdus, The Missouri
Non-Partisan Court Plan, 43 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 9, 13-15 (1941)).
65. See MARTIN, supra note 60, at 22.
66. A 2004 poll commissioned by the Justice At Stake campaign found that sev-
enty-one percent of Americans believe that campaign contributions from interest
groups influence judges’ decisions.  Eighty-two percent expressed concern that the
United States Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765 (2002), will increase special interest group influence on judicial decisions.  Justice
At Stake Campaign, March 2004 Survey Highlights: Americans Speak Out on Judicial
Elections, available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/ZogbyPollFact Sheet.pdf
(last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
67. CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 52, at 14-15.  A variation on this reasoning is
often found in provisions that allow commissioners to actively recruit applicants for a
judicial position.  For example, the Rules of the Judicial Nominating Board of the
State of Vermont include the following: “Board members may actively seek out and
encourage qualified individuals to apply for judicial office.  Board members should
always keep in mind that often the person with the highest qualifications will not
actively seek judicial appointment.” JUDICIAL NOMINATING BD. OF THE STATE OF
VT. R. 6.
68. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 24.
69. Id.
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ing of the American Judicature Society, Walker Spencer proposed
that nominating commissions should include judges, lawyers, and
laypersons.70  In 1940, when Missouri became the first state in the
nation to adopt a commission-based appointment system, the plan
specified that commissions would include a judge, with an equal
number of lawyers and non-lawyers.71  In 1962, the American Bar
Association approved the Model Judicial Article that included a
commission-based appointment system, with commissions com-
posed of judicial, lawyer, and non-lawyer members.72  Today, most
commissions include at least one judge, and nearly all include both
lawyers and laypersons.73  In general, lawyers are appointed by the
state or local bar association and lay members are appointed by the
governor.  Of the thirty-two states74 that currently use commission-
based appointment to select some or all of their judges, fifteen
have commissions including at least one judge75 and twenty-eight
commissions include both lawyers and nonlawyers.76
The fact that governors, state legislators, and bar associations
have responsibility for choosing some or all of the commissioners77
has generated two primary concerns about the membership of judi-
cial nominating commissions.  First, how immune are commission-
ers, appointed by political figures, from political influence?
70. See Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure—Its
Historical Development, in SELECTED READINGS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE AND ITS IMPROVEMENT 2, 4-5 (Glenn R. Winters & R. Stanley Lowe eds., 1971).
71. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 24.
72. Id.
73. JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION, supra note 9, at 3-7.
74. Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia use commission-based appoint-
ment.  Therefore, although thirty-three jurisdictions use the method, only thirty-two
are states. Id.
75. Those states that do not include a judge on the commission are: Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and
Wisconsin.  It is important to note that in Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, and Massa-
chusetts, commission-based appointment is established by executive order.  In these
states, therefore, the governor has exclusive control over the makeup of the nominat-
ing commission, although the qualifications for membership are often specified in the
executive order. Id.
76. Those states that do not include both lawyers and nonlawyers are Florida
(which provides that the nominating commission for the Florida Supreme Court shall
have six lawyers and three additional members that can either be lawyers or nonlawy-
ers), Georgia, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin.  Georgia and Massachusetts have both
adopted commission-based appointment by executive order, which means that the
governor has sole responsibility to fill seats on the commission. Id. at 7-9.
77. With few exceptions, these three groups appoint commissioners in nearly all
jurisdictions. See generally id.
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Second, do bar associations exert too much influence in the
process?
Political Influence
The proposed advantage of commission-based appointment sys-
tems is the existence of the commission––a bipartisan group of
people outside of the political environment and therefore able to
evaluate the candidates without being influenced by politics.  Pure
appointive systems, where the governor or legislature is solely re-
sponsible for appointment of judges, is unquestionably a political
process.78  But, is it possible that commissioners are truly removed
from politics?  During the 1950s and 1960s, considerable concern
arose that the adoption of commission-based appointment systems
would not eliminate politics, but would move politics from out in
the open and shut it behind closed doors where only a few could
influence the process.  As Jack W. Peltason writes:
The Missouri Court Plan will not ‘take the courts out of polit-
ics’ as claimed, but instead it will result in a more insidious type
of politics. . . .  Under the system of popular election, the task of
the political minded and those who wished to dominate the
judges was much more difficult because the right to pick judges
was not the monopoly of a few. . . . [T]he type of politics that
will ensue from the Missouri Court Plan will be of the worst
sort.  Any politics that existed under the old system of direct
popular election was of the out-in-the-open brand.  The effect of
the Missouri Court Plan is not to take the courts out of politics,
but to drive what politics exists underground.  Politics will be-
come the secret, backroom type.79
Most commissioners are chosen by the governor or the bar asso-
ciation in their state or locality.  Therefore, it is at least plausible
that they may represent the preferences of those who appointed
them as they screen applicants and make recommendations.  Rich-
ard Watson and Rondal Downing produced one of the most com-
prehensive studies of political influences on the Missouri system in
1969.  They reported incidences of “panel wiring,” when the gover-
nor communicated to commissioners her preferred candidate for a
judicial position and those commissioners produced a list of recom-
mendations, including the governor’s choice among a list of arbi-
78. See JUSTICE FOR HIRE, supra note 61, at 34.
79. Peltason, supra note 60, at 102.
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trary names—names which would not matter because they would
not be chosen.80
Despite the assumption that commissioners will be politically
loyal to those who appointed them to the commission, commission-
ers report that political considerations rarely enter commission de-
liberations.  Allan Ashman and James Alfini’s 1974 survey of
judicial nominating commissioners reveals that political influences
and considerations did sometimes enter the deliberations, although
only two percent of respondents reported that political influences
were “always” included in commission discussions.81  They
reported:
Of the 49% [of commissioners surveyed] who stated that po-
litical influences or considerations were introduced (however in-
frequently) into commission deliberations, only 7% (3% of all
respondents) believed that when such considerations actually
were introduced they were of decisive importance.  Twenty-
seven percent of the responding commissioners felt that such in-
fluences or considerations were of some importance but not de-
cisive.  Forty-two percent (20% of all respondents) felt that such
influences were of little importance and the remaining 24% felt
that they were of no importance.  Thus 36% of the total number
of respondents stated that political influences had been inter-
jected into their deliberations at some time and that these influ-
ences or considerations had some effect, albeit minor in many
instances, in determining the eventual selection made by the
commission.82
Similarly, Joanne Martin reports that only one percent of the
seventy-six commission chairs from thirty-four states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia that she surveyed in 1993 indicated that political
influences were “always” used in commission deliberations, while
thirty-one percent responded that they were “infrequently” used,
and forty-eight percent indicated that they were “never” part of
commission decision-making.83
It is impossible to create a perfectly nonpartisan system for se-
lecting judges.84  Nonetheless, provisions that mandate bipartisan-
ship on the nominating commission come closer to that ideal than
80. RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH
AND THE BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT
PLAN 108 (1969).
81. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 75-77.
82. Id. at 75-76.
83. MARTIN, supra note 60, at 20.
84. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 78.
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commissions that allow partisanship.85  Currently, sixteen states re-
quire commissions to be bipartisan.86  Furthermore, the statutory
language may limit the political activities of nominating commis-
sioners, which lessens the potential risk that commissioners will
have immediate political loyalties during their term of service.  As
of now, thirteen of the thirty-three jurisdictions that use a nominat-
ing commission include a provision that prohibits commissioners
from engaging in political activities.87
The Influence of the Organized Bar
Some have suggested that the push for “merit selection” in the
1950s and 1960s was a thinly-veiled effort to increase the role of
the legal profession in the recruitment and selection of judges.88
Because bar associations and the legal community within state and
local jurisdictions often play specific roles in recommending or ap-
pointing members of judicial nominating commissions, the legal
profession certainly influences the selection of judges.
Of all the activities in which bar associations engage during se-
lection processes,89 bar leaders report that the ability to select com-
mission members is the single most efficacious way to influence the
85. Id. at 78-79.
86. Most often, this institutionalized bipartisanship is expressed in the states’ con-
stitutional language and requires that no more than half of the commissioners plus
one can be from the same political party.  The Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selec-
tion in the States, http://www.ajs.org/js (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).  Ashman and Alfini
note one possible negative consequence of bipartisanship: provisions that require bi-
partisanship may decrease the likelihood that individuals who have no clear identifi-
cation with a political party will be appointed to a nominating commission. See
ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 78-79.
87. Currently, these provisions are used in Alabama, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, and Wyoming. JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION, supra note 9, at 18.
88. Charles Sheldon and Linda Maule write:
Fear of party politics led to nonpartisan elections which were designed to
encourage the citizen-voter to be involved but rather brought interest
groups, especially bar associations, into recruitment.  Next, but not finally,
some of the voters’ influence was sacrificed and the legal profession’s role
increased through the Missouri plan.  The upshot is that in states today there
is a mix of methods and often even within a single state.  Nonetheless, it is
most likely that the same traditional groups are involved to varying degrees
in recruiting judges along with a collection of newer groups.  All are at-
tempting to exert some influence over who finally dons the robes of judicial
office.
SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 18, at 7-8.
89. “Selection processes” includes judicial elections as well as appointment
systems.
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makeup of the bench.90  Charles Sheldon surveyed 435 bar leaders
and reported that:
Even bar leaders in states [where bar associations] only nomi-
nate or recommend attorneys to be appointed to commissions
by governors regard the results of this official activity as fairly
effective (7.6 rating [on a scale of 1-10]).  A Mississippi respon-
dent wrote that the nine attorneys who had been recommended
to the governor for appointment to three-year terms on the
commission are ‘very effective’ and ‘have a strong voice in the
committee’s decisions.’91
Is it true that bar associations and the representatives of bar as-
sociations who serve as judicial nominating commissioners have a
“strong voice” in commission deliberations?  One might suspect
that this is the case because lawyers have existing connections to
the legal world, understand the courtroom environment, and can
draw on their legal expertise to discuss complicated areas of law
during deliberations, including interviews with applicants.92  But
laypersons who serve on judicial nominating commissions report
that they do not feel as though lawyer members dominate the dis-
cussion.  Ashman and Alfini indicate that “responses to our ques-
tionnaires reveal that very few lay members felt dominated by the
lawyers and . . . equally few lawyer members felt the lay members
to be superfluous.”93  A 1973 report in Massachusetts concluded
that:
The interaction between lawyers and laymen on the Committee
is of some interest.  Except in one or two cases, most of the lay-
men have scant knowledge of the courts, the judiciary, or their
recent problems.  The laymen, however, soon realized that they
were as perceptive as the lawyers about people, and equally ad-
ept in evaluating available information.  While laymen had to
defer to lawyer opinions about legal experience, they had
strong, independent views and were by no means dominated or
manipulated by the lawyers.  Lawyer perceptions of the lay
members confirm the capacity and desirability of lay participa-
90. Charles H. Sheldon, The Role of State Bar Associations in Judicial Selection, 77
JUDICATURE 300, 301 (1994).
91. Id. at 302.
92. Martin’s 1993 study of judicial nominating commissions indicates that every
commission reported having interviews with the applicants and the overwhelming ma-
jority reported that one of the topics of the candidate questionnaire is the applicant’s
“views and attitudes concerning law.”  While this could be very broad on a candi-
date’s questionnaire, interpreting the applicants may require substantial understand-
ing of legal precedent and legal procedure. See MARTIN, supra note 60, at 52-60.
93. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 25.
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tion.  Most felt that lay people provided a more detached view
of the system, bringing a consumer citizen perspective to bear,
and counteracting the ‘chumminess’ that tends to exist among
lawyers.94
The role of the bar is sometimes cited as a reason for distrust of
commission-based appointment systems as they are currently im-
plemented.  Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the bar or law-
yer members of judicial nominating commissions have
inappropriate control over commission procedures or decisions.
Are Commissions Representative?
In addition to concerns about the role of the bar, some have
questioned the extent to which commissions are representative of
the community in making recommendations to the governor.  Typi-
cally, two separate issues dominate: the lack of geographic repre-
sentation on nominating commissions and the over-representation
of privileged segments of society.
In several cases, judicial nominating commissioners may not re-
side in the area or district for which a judicial vacancy exists.  For
example, in Alaska, one nominating commission is charged with
reviewing applications and making recommendations for the su-
preme court, the superior court, the court of appeals, and all dis-
trict courts throughout the state.95  Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have similar systems.96  When one com-
mission is charged with filling vacancies on all state courts, it is
entirely possible that the commission making recommendations to
fill a seat will not include a single person who lives in the area over
which the judge will preside.97  It is difficult to justify the creation
of additional commissions for each district, particularly for lesser
populated states using commission-based appointment only to fill
94. Robertson & Gordon, Merit Screening of Judges in Massachusetts: The Experi-
ence of the Ad Hoc Committee, 58 MASS. L.Q. 131, 138 (1973), quoted in ASHMAN &
ALFINI, supra note 1, at 26.
95. JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION, supra note 9, at 3.
96. Id. at 3-7.
97. This point was raised by Ellison A. Neel during Missouri’s Constitutional Con-
vention in 1943, which considered eliminating the commission-based appointment sys-
tem. See Peltason, supra note 60, at 95, 100-01.
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interim vacancies,98 especially once the existing commission has ac-
quired experience.  Nonetheless, the issue remains significant in
some jurisdictions and deserves greater attention.
The extent to which commissions are dominated by privileged
populations within the state is a more common question and there
have been extensive inquiries into the demographic characteristics
and background experiences of commissioners.  Generally, com-
missioners are white and male.  In 1974, Ashman and Alfini re-
ported that 97.8% of commissioners were white and 89.6% were
male.99  By 1990, Beth Henschen, Robert Moog, and Steven Davis
found that commissioners were still overwhelmingly white (ninety-
three percent), but that Hispanic Americans had made significant
gains.  While Ashman and Alfini found that only 0.2% of commis-
sioners were Hispanic, Henschen, et al. found that Hispanic mem-
bership had increased to two percent.100  Similarly, by 1990, women
made up twenty-five percent of commissioners, up from ten per-
cent in 1974.101  Lawyer members, however, remain predominantly
male (ninety percent).102  Overall, those who serve on nominating
commissions are considerably more educated than the general pub-
lic and many have served in a party office (twenty-six percent), are
elected office holders (thirty-one percent), or are members of civic
organizations (sixty-seven percent).103  Clearly, commission mem-
bers’ characteristics do not reflect the characteristics of the Ameri-
can citizenry.  Whether the disproportionate number of white,
male, politically-minded individuals serving on nominating com-
missions affects the decision-making of nominating commissions is
difficult to determine.
III. COMMISSION PROCEDURES
Although there is extensive literature that considers the compo-
sition of nominating commissions and the potential role of politics
in commission deliberations, there is only nascent literature on the
procedures that nominating commissioners use to make decisions.
98. Of these states, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, and Wisconsin only use commis-
sions to recommend candidates for interim vacancies. JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION,
supra note 9, at 3-4, 6.
99. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 38.
100. Id.; Beth M. Henschen et al., Judicial Nominating Commissioners: A National
Profile, 73 JUDICATURE 328, 329 (1990).
101. Henschen et al., supra note 100, at 329; see also ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note
1, at 38.
102. Henschen et. al., supra note 100, at 330.
103. Id. at 330-32.
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It is often said that the rules of the game determine the outcome;
here, understanding the rules and procedures that govern commis-
sion work can certainly help us assess the efficacy of these commis-
sions.  While the “who picks the pickers” question has been asked
repeatedly (here and elsewhere), I devote the remainder of this
Article to another equally important but often overlooked ques-
tion: “How do the pickers pick?”
It is important to understand what nominating commissions do.
For the most part, all nominating commissions serve similar func-
tions.  First, commissioners are responsible for soliciting applica-
tions when a vacancy occurs on the bench.  This often takes the
form of advertising in legal publications, but may also include ac-
tive recruitment of talented legal minds.104  Second, commissioners
are charged with screening each of the applicants to determine
whether minimum legal requirements for a judgeship are met and
whether the applicants are qualified for a seat on the bench.105
Third, each commission engages in an evaluation process, whereby
they assess the relative merits of each of the applicants.106  The
evaluation of applicants is usually based on a questionnaire that is
completed by every applicant, but commissioners may also investi-
gate each applicant by collecting information from their financial
records, contacting law enforcement agencies and disciplinary bod-
ies, or even surveying local members of the bar.107  In addition,
commissioners conduct interviews with the applicants during the
evaluation process.108  After collecting information to evaluate
each applicant, commissioners must come to a decision about
whom to recommend to the governor.  How this decision is made
varies by commission.109  Each of these tasks may seem simple, but
the manner in which a commission goes about completing the tasks
(and the extent to which they have established procedures that can
be applied consistently to do so) has a significant impact on their
final recommendations.
104. See MARTIN, supra note 60, at 9-10.
105. Id. at 8-9.
106. Id. at 10-12.
107. MARLA N. GREENSTEIN & KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, HANDBOOK FOR JUDI-
CIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS 108-110 (2d ed. 2004).
108. See generally id. at 131-52.  Martin reports that every commission represented
by her survey conducts interviews with applicants. MARTIN, supra note 60, at 52-56.
109. The American Judicature Society recommends a written voting rule that re-
quires a successive majority voting system.  This system is used in Rhode Island and
Nevada and is recommended in Iowa. See GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107,
at 156-57, 161-66.
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Because they serve such a fundamental role in any commission-
based appointment system, nominating commissions should ideally
establish procedures that encourage fair and independent assess-
ments of applicants.  The most common conclusion about nominat-
ing commission procedures, however, is that they are often
informal and vary considerably from one jurisdiction to the next.110
In 1974, when Ashman and Alfini produced the first major study of
nominating commissions, they concluded that:
Because most merit selection plans do not contain provisions
which dictate the procedures to be followed by the nominating
commissions, the commissions generally have broad discretion
in their recruiting, screening, evaluating, and nominating proce-
dures.  In fact, most plans explicitly grant to the nominating
commission full authority to adopt any and all rules of proce-
dure which it deems appropriate.111
In 1984, Marla Greenstein authored the first edition of The
American Judicature Society’s HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMI-
NATING COMMISSIONERS, in which she reported that nearly all of
the nominating commissions she examined in 1984 were authorized
to establish rules for their own operation.112  Given that most nom-
inating commissioners are unpaid volunteers who have little expe-
rience or training,113 delegating the authority to establish operating
procedures and rules for decision-making to commissioners may
lead to inconsistent, unorganized, or ad hoc processes.  Inconsis-
tent, unorganized, and ad hoc decision-making undermines the
critical function of the commission, as it can easily lead to bias (in-
tended or unintended) and can undermine public confidence in the
process.  As Ashman and Alfini note, “[i]f the commission con-
ducts its business in a careless, disorganized fashion it is almost cer-
tain that the plan will not exhibit the attributes of a good judicial
selection process.”114
Many commissions do have specific rules governing their inter-
actions with the appointing authority, the applicants, and the pub-
110. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 60, at 21-22.
111. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 42.
112. There were some exceptions, including nominating commissions in Georgia,
Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont.  In some of
these jurisdictions, the state supreme court or court of appeals promulgated rules gov-
erning the operation of the commission. MARLA N. GREENSTEIN, HANDBOOK FOR
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS 16-20 (1st ed. 1984).
113. Id. at 2; see, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 60, at 6 (reporting that, of the commis-
sion chairs surveyed, fifty-six percent had served as chair for one year or less, while
only twenty-eight percent had served for three years or more).
114. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 41.
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lic.  Nearly all commissions are governed by confidentiality
requirements, for example.  In eighteen of the thirty-two states that
use nominating commissions, the records of the commission must
be kept confidential, while in seven states, commissioners are not
required to keep these records confidential.115  In eighteen states,
the interviews conducted by the commission are confidential, while
in seven, they are not.116  What is particularly remarkable, how-
ever, is that seven states have no formal provisions whatsoever to
indicate whether records will be kept confidential or not, and seven
states have no formal provision governing whether interviews will
be confidential or not.117  In fact, five states have no written rules
about whether or not commission deliberations will be confidential,
and seven states have no written rules that govern whether com-
mission voting will be confidential.118  When there are no rules spe-
cifically governing something as fundamental as whether
information will be kept confidential, the commission itself is re-
sponsible for determining whether information will be released or
not.119  It is entirely possible that these decisions are made on a
case-by-case basis.120
115. Those states that require confidentiality for commission records are: Alabama,
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah,
and Vermont.  Those that specifically do not designate commission records as confi-
dential are: Alaska, Florida, Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Tennes-
see. See JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION, supra note 9, at 16-17.
116. In Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont, interviews are confidential.  In Arizona,
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, New Mexico, and Rhode Island, they are not. See
id.  In those states that have enacted Open Meeting Laws, nominating commissions
are usually required by law to hold open meetings or to provide information to the
public about their deliberations.  Ristau v. Casey, 64 A.2d 642, 647-48 (Pa. 1994);
Barton P. Jenks, Rhode Island’s New Judicial Merit Selection Law, 1 ROGER WIL-
LIAMS U. L. REV. 63, 80-81 (1996).
117. Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Wy-
oming have no rules regarding commission records and Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota,
Nevada, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have no rules regarding commission
interviews. See JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION, supra note 9, at 16-17.
118. The five states that have no provision governing deliberations are: Georgia,
Kansas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  The seven states that have no provi-
sion governing voting are: Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming. See id.
119. In many cases, the commissions themselves establish rules governing such im-
portant topics.  Absent well-written guidelines, this will lead to the inconsistency dis-
cussed above.
120. I do not mean to imply that commissioners themselves are purposefully or
intentionally being irresponsible in their behavior, merely that the lack of written
rules can easily lead to situations where there is no guidance and decisions must be
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Commissions also must have internal rules to govern how they
will go about their work.  Are commissioners responsible for solic-
iting applications or recruiting qualified applicants?  Are commis-
sioners required to disclose personal connections with applicants?
What happens if a commissioner is faced with a conflict of interest
and fails to disclose that information to the chair and/or other com-
missioners?  Should commissioners consider diversity as one crite-
rion that may shape their choice?  If so, how important is it relative
to other evaluative criteria?  What if a commissioner’s neighbor
communicates information about one of the applicants that is unfa-
vorable?  Is the commissioner required or even encouraged to
share that information with others?  Can commissioners actively
participate in partisan or political activities?  If a commissioner has
not participated in all interviews, can she still vote on the final rec-
ommendations?  Does the commission have written voting rules to
determine who will be recommended to the appointing authority?
What criteria will be used to evaluate each candidate?
After surveying nominating commissioners, Ashman and Alfini
reported “that most of the commissions either have not exercised
their authority to adopt procedural rules, or, if they have adopted
such rules, have neglected to commit them to written form.121
Many of the surveyed commissioners indicated that adopting writ-
ten procedural rules would improve the nominating process, as the
lack of written rules has caused confusion among commission
members.122
In the HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS,
Marla Greenstein concluded that “judicial nominating commission-
ers often express frustration with the unstructured decision making
within their commissions,”123 and recommended that “detailed
rules should structure the discretion of the commissions and have
the salutary effect of ensuring a more ordered consideration of
made on the spot.  In the case of Georgia, the lack of established rules is most likely
the result of the fact that commission-based appointment is set up by executive order.
Therefore, the governor has complete responsibility for governing the operation of
the nominating commission. JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION, supra note 9, at 9.  It is
interesting to note, however, that in other jurisdictions where commission-based ap-
pointment has been established by executive order, there are rules that govern confi-
dentiality. See id. at 8-12, 16-17.
121. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 42.
122. Id.  The responses to the questionnaire indicated that, in at least seven jurisdic-
tions, members of the same commission disagreed as to whether their commission had
compiled written procedural rules. Id. at 42-43.
123. GREENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 21-22.
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each applicant, while minimizing the possibility that commissioners
will be guided by vague standards and improper influences.”124
In 2004, when the second edition of the HANDBOOK FOR JUDI-
CIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS was published, Kathleen
Sampson noted that since the publication of the first edition in
1984, commissions had refined their procedural rules and some
state and local jurisdictions published their own handbooks for
commissioners.125  She also noted that “national developments,
such as passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, increased
concern about applicants’ privacy and commissions’ confidentiality
procedures, the changing role of the trial judge, newer interviewing
techniques, and the ever-present importance of ethical conduct by
commissioners have indicated the need for an updated
edition. . . .”126
If we recognize that rules structure decision-making, then the
rules and procedures of judicial nominating commissions structure
the nomination and appointment of judges throughout the country.
Yet little attention is paid to these rules and procedures, not only in
academic studies of commissions, but also in the statutory and con-
stitutional language that creates commissions.  For the most part,
commissioners make up the rules as they go.  Some commissions
have remarkably sophisticated rules, while others operate largely
on an ad hoc basis with little to guide decision making processes.  If
we seek to design an appointive method of selection that produces
the best possible judiciary, we need to spend considerable time
thinking about how nominating commissions can and should
choose judges.
IV. EXISTING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
At each stage of decision-making, commission procedures deter-
mine how applicants will be evaluated and who will be recom-
mended to the governor.
124. Id.  This recommendation was taken directly from Ashman and Alfini’s 1974
work.  The fact that the recommendation was repeated ten years after its initial publi-
cation in the HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS indicates that
there was little improvement in the development of commission rules and procedures.
See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 229.
125. GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107, at vii.
126. Id.
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Conflicts of interest and political activity
Commission-based appointment is only successful insofar as the
nominating commission is removed from political pressure.  Fur-
thermore, in order to maintain public confidence in the judiciary,
commissioners must recognize that they serve in a representative
capacity and the choices they make will have a profound effect on
the state’s citizenry.127  To promote public confidence and ensure
that decision-making remains untainted by favoritism or impropri-
ety,128 commissions can develop formal rules that govern the politi-
cal activities of commissioners and require disqualification in any
commission deliberations that may pose a conflict of interest.129
Conflicts of interest are particularly problematic because they
undermine commissioners’ ability to assess all applicants impar-
tially, a critical responsibility of the commission. Commissioners
may encounter situations where personal or professional relation-
ships impair their ability to be impartial, or they may be influenced
by their affiliation with a political party.130  A majority of states
have rules regarding disqualification of a nominating commissioner
in situations that present a conflict of interest.131  Rhode Island in-
cludes the following in Section VII of the Uniform Rules of Proce-
dure of the Judicial Nominating Commission: “A Commissioner
shall disclose to other Commissioners all personal and business re-
lationships with an applicant for judicial vacancy that may directly
or indirectly influence the commissioner’s decision.  If a substantial
conflict of interest is apparent, the Commissioner shall disqualify
127. MARTIN, supra note 60, at 3.
128. GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 3.
129. The American Judicature Society recommends formal rules governing com-
mission ethics:
A formal ethics provision emphasizes the importance of ethical behavior,
establishes minimum standards for commissioner behavior, provides aspira-
tional goals for commissioners, and promotes public trust by emphasizing
propriety and the appearance of propriety in all the commission’s activities.
Such a provision also gives consistent and explicit guidance over time as
commissioners’ terms expire and new members join.
Id. at 4.
130. Id. at 5-7.
131. Disqualification provisions exist in Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Ha-
waii, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont.  In Iowa,
such a provision is part of the sample procedures for nominating commissions.  These
sample procedures have been adopted by some commissions, but even those commis-
sions that have not formally adopted these provisions use them as informal guidelines.
See generally JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION, supra note 9.
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himself from voting on further consideration of any affected
applicant.”132
State provisions may explicitly define business, professional, or
personal relationships that would present a conflict of interest, but
often do not do so. 133  In addition, there is still considerable flexi-
bility about enforcement of conflict of interest restrictions.  De-
spite having fairly well-structured rules that require commissioners
to recuse themselves from discussions or deliberations that present
a conflict of interest, the decision of whether to notify other com-
missioners and whether a relationship is one that may present a
conflict of interest are questions that are usually left to the commis-
sioner.  Few states include rules that provide mechanisms to force
commissioners to refrain from participating in commission deci-
sion-making when a conflict of interest exists.  New York City’s
provisions include the following language:
If a member of the Committee has any relationship to a candi-
date that may unduly influence, or appear to unduly influence,
the member’s decision as to the candidate, the member will dis-
close the same to the Committee.  In such case, if the member
does not voluntarily abstain from voting upon the candidate, a
majority of a quorum of the Committee present and voting at
any meeting may determine that the member shall abstain.  The
abstention will be recorded in the minutes of the meeting.  How-
ever, no member shall in any event be precluded from present-
ing his/her views of the candidate to the Committee after
disclosing any such relationship.134
Indiana, Vermont, and Utah are among the states that do en-
force conflict of interest rules, allowing a majority of the commis-
sion to determine whether the conflict will impair the
commissioner’s impartiality.135  Nebraska’s rules allow any person
to challenge the impartiality of a commissioner.136  Rhode Island’s
rules allow any commissioner who faces a potential conflict of in-
132. GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 5 (quoting UNIF. R.P. FOR THE
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’N § 7).
133. For definitions of business or professional relationships, see, for example, Ma-
ryland and Rhode Island provisions which explicitly include “any relationship where
the commissioner has a substantial and direct pecuniary or monetary interest.” Id. at
7.  For definitions of personal relationships, see, for example, Nebraska and Alaska
provisions. Id.  Nebraska’s rules also include “any relationship where the commis-
sioner shared a residence with the applicant during the previous five years.” Id.
134. New York City Mayor’s Committee on the Judiciary: Procedures and Policy
17(b) (emphasis added).
135. GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 7-8.
136. Id.
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terest to submit a statement, in writing, that explains the nature of
the conflict and either formally requests to be recused or explains
why the conflict will not impair the commissioner’s objective evalu-
ation of the applicants.137
Although these provisions certainly go a long way toward elimi-
nating conflicts of interest, it largely remains the commissioner’s
responsibility to assess whether a relationship presents a conflict.
States should work to develop enforcement mechanisms that can
hold commissioners accountable should they fail to disclose a con-
flict of interest or recuse themselves in cases where there would be
any impropriety or appearance of impropriety.138  Similarly, estab-
lishing a review process that regularly investigates any complaints
or questions the commission’s implementation of conflict of inter-
est provisions will ensure that commissioners take these provisions
seriously, and honestly assess whether they can perform their role.
Beyond personal or professional relationships, commissioners
may be active in partisan politics,139 which may compromise their
ability to evaluate applicants fairly and impartially.  Only thirteen
states, however, have formal provisions restricting the political ac-
tivity of commissioners.140
Furthermore, commissioners should be governed by general
rules of ethical behavior similar to those applied to other public
officials.  Only eight states currently have formal ethics provisions
that govern nominating commissioners.141  For example, Rhode Is-
land’s Uniform Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Nominating
Commission includes the following ethics provision:
Judicial Nominating Commissioners hold positions of public
trust.  Public confidence in Commission members and the com-
position of the Commission itself is paramount.  Any factors
which might erode such public confidence, or be perceived to do
137. Id.
138. Any number of state actors might enact these provisions to hold commission-
ers accountable.  These provisions may be included in the statutory language that au-
thorizes the commission, may be codified into an executive order, could be
promulgated by the state Supreme Court, or may be formally adopted in the commis-
sion’s own rules of procedure.
139. In fact, many commissioners have not only been party activists, but have also
served as elected officials.  Henschen et. al., supra note 100, at 332.
140. Commissioners are restricted from participating in political activity in Ala-
bama, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wyoming. See JUDICIAL MERIT SE-
LECTION, supra note 9, at 18-19.
141. The seven states with ethical provisions are: Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Tennessee. Id. at 18-19.
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so, shall be avoided.  No Commissioner shall conduct himself in
a manner which reflects discredit upon the judicial selection pro-
cess.  Consideration of the applicants shall be made impartially,
discreetly, and objectively.142
Adopting specific codes of ethics and ensuring that all nominat-
ing commissioners understand those rules will help guide decision-
making and increase public trust in the commission’s
recommendations.143
Evaluative Criteria
The set of criteria used to evaluate applicants is arguably the
most fundamental component of nominating commission proce-
dures.  The function of every nominating commission is to evaluate
applicants and determine which applicants are best qualified for
the bench.  Therefore, determining the criteria to be used in this
process and applying those criteria consistently across all appli-
cants is essential to the integrity of the process. Not only do com-
missioners determine whether the minimum legal qualifications to
become a judge have been met, but they determine whether an
individual is well-suited to judicial service.144  Commissions are
therefore asked to weigh multiple criteria as they consider the
strengths and weaknesses of each applicant.  These criteria may in-
clude, but are not limited to, the applicant’s legal training, profes-
sional skills, interpersonal skills, writing ability, knowledge of and
experience with alternative dispute resolution, and ability to man-
age a courtroom environment.145
It is notoriously difficult to determine exactly what qualities, or
combination of qualities, will produce the “best” judge.  And, given
the fallibility of humans, forecasting with any certainty an individ-
ual applicant’s behavior as a judge is impossible.  As Maurice Ro-
senberg notes:
An inquiry such as this probes so deeply into imponderables
that it may be rash to enter upon it even with the greatest diffi-
142. GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 5 (quoting UNIF. R.P. FOR THE
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’N § 7).
143. Id. at 13.
144. Id. at 70-78.
145. The specific evaluative criteria that are used to consider applicants for any
judgeship will depend upon the nature of the vacancy.  For example, trial court judges
will have sole responsibility for managing the courtroom environment while appel-
late-level judges work in a more structured setting with multiple judges overseeing the
proceedings.  Similarly, appellate judgeships require a greater ability to work in a col-
laborative atmosphere.  The criteria should, therefore, be tailored to the position.
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dence.  Obviously, the custodians of every sector of human ac-
tivity are eager to compile a list of qualities that ‘best equip’ a
man to perform the chosen work with excellence, but every-
where the composition of the list is notoriously elusive.  It is par-
ticularly obscure when the qualities sought are personal,
subjective, and human.  Yet, as hard as the task may be, there is
a special urgency for finding the human qualities in a judge that
are most promising and the flaws that are most damaging.  More
than the teacher, the engineer, or the lawyer, the judge acts di-
rectly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his fellows.146
Commissioners have a responsibility to consider the full range of
characteristics that each individual will bring to the bench.  Of the
characteristics considered, polled commissioners report that mental
and physical health are the most important personal background
factors taken into account.147  In evaluating professional skills,
commissioners report that they are most concerned about the ap-
plicant’s reputation for fairness, integrity, and preparedness.148
Commissioners must also evaluate an applicant’s personality.  In
doing so, commissioners tend to emphasize moral courage, open-
mindedness, objectivity, and emotional stability.149  Particularly
noteworthy is commissioners’ reliance on subjective criteria rather
than quantifiable, objective measures of performance in all aspects
of evaluation.150
146. Maurice Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices—Are They Strainable?, 44 TEX.
L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1966).
147. These characteristics were far and away the most important that were men-
tioned (97.2% of commissioners surveyed reported that mental health was among the
“most relevant” characteristics, and 80.8% reported that physical health was among
the “most relevant”), whereas the law school that the applicant attended (5.0%), ac-
tive involvement in professional activities (13.7%), previous service as a judge
(22.4%), and the applicant’s law school record (26.0%) were consistently rated as far
less important. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 62.
148. Of the commissioners that Ashman and Alfini surveyed, 86.6% rated profes-
sional reputation as among the “most relevant” skills an applicant can have, 91.4%
rated a reputation for fairness as “most relevant,” 95.0% reported that a reputation
for propriety and integrity in legal matters was “most relevant,” and 79.9% reported
that it was important that an applicant be well-prepared and thorough. Id. at 64.
149. The survey also indicated that 92.4% of commissioners report that moral cour-
age is among the “most relevant” characteristics, 91.7% designate open mindedness
and objectivity as “most relevant,” and 85.9% report that emotional stability is among
the “most relevant” characteristics an applicant can possess. Id. at 66.
150. Rosenberg notes that: “[a] striking feature of these highest ranking attributes
is that they tend to focus upon the personality or person of the candidate—what he is
rather than what he has done, his innate or intrinsic qualities rather than his ‘external’
attainments.”  Rosenberg, supra note 146, at 1067.  Similarly, Ashman and Alfini note
that:
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Given the primacy of evaluative criteria, it is particularly striking
that fewer than half of the states that use nominating commissions
have any formal statutory language that specifies the criteria to be
used to evaluate candidates.  In many states, the authorizing lan-
guage includes vague reference to the criteria that shall be used.
This is the case in Vermont, where the state’s code, as well as the
Rules of the Judicial Nominating Board, require that:
[The] criteria and standards for nomination . . . includ[e] but
[are] not limited to such factors as integrity, legal knowledge
and ability, judicial temperament, impartiality, health, experi-
ence, diligence, administrative and communicative skills, social
consciousness and public service. . . . [W]ith respect to a candi-
date for superior or district judge particular consideration shall
be given to the nature and extent of his trial practice.151
New York has used a set of fourteen questions that commission-
ers should consider as they evaluate applicants, including:
Does the applicant inspire your confidence in his (her) per-
sonal honesty, integrity, and moral courage?
Does the applicant have a good reputation (in the community
and in the profession) for character and integrity?
Is the applicant open-minded, impartial, and fair?
Will the applicant abstain from politics in the performance of
his (her) judicial duties?
Will the applicant be courteous, considerate, and patient
when dealing with counsel, litigants, and witnesses?
Will the applicant be prompt and industrious in the perform-
ance of his (her) judicial duties?
Does the applicant have wide-ranging analytical powers?
Does the applicant have sufficient actual expertise in the prac-
tice of law?
Is the applicant well-educated and well-informed generally?
Regardless of the applicant’s particular strengths or weak-
nesses (whether or not reflected in the above ratings), do you
[w]hat stands out in these results is that subjective considerations such as
reputation, knowledge, skill in communication, all clearly outrank the more
easily ascertainable and measurable qualifications such as amount of experi-
ence, number of honors, type of practice and degree of success.  When con-
fronted with this question directly, 70.3% of the respondents replied that
they themselves placed greater emphasis on the more subjective attributes
and 37.6% felt that their commission emphasized the more objectively ascer-
tainable information.
ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 65.
151. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 601(d), 602(b) (2006).
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think that he (she) has an overall potential to become a highly
capable judge?152
Likewise, Connecticut’s commission regulations specify twenty-
three questions to be considered,153 including the following:
Does the candidate possess the statutory qualifications for
office?
Does the prospect possess legal ability that is exemplified by
professional excellence, a degree of intellect and a technical pro-
ficiency equal to that required by the highest standards of the
practicing bar?
Is the candidate generally intelligent and knowledgeable?
Is the candidate courteous and considerate?
Is the candidate patient, attentive, and temperate?
Is the candidate free of tendencies which would indicate the
possibility of abuse of the power or prestige of office?
Is the candidate free from activities or relationships which
might tend to interfere with the candidate’s performance as a
judge?
Given the essential functions of being a judge are the ability
to preside over a court, to analyze cases, and to render decisions
based on the law and facts, can the candidate perform these es-
sential functions with or without reasonable accommodation?154
Even in these states that provide an extensive list of questions to
guide commission deliberations, finding the means to actually de-
termine how any single applicant would behave as a judge, particu-
larly given the limited amount of personal interaction
commissioners have with applicants,155 is exceptionally difficult
work.  Commissioners are asked to perform a nearly impossible
152. The American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States, MAYOR’S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, EVALUATION SCALE OF JUDICIAL APPLI-
CANTS (2001) (unpublished, on file with The American Judicature Society).
153. In addition to the twenty-three questions for judicial applicants generally, the
regulations provide an additional thirty-one separate questions that should guide con-
sideration of incumbent judges who seek reappointment to the same court or eleva-
tion to a higher court. THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE
PROGRAMS REVIEW AND INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL SELECTION—FI-
NAL REPORT, Ch. 3, (2000) available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/pri/archives/2000jsreport
chap3.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
154. Id.
155. All commissions solicit information on a questionnaire that is common to all
applicants.  In addition, commissions conduct personal interviews with applicants.
Martin reports that seventy percent of commissions interview all applicants, eight per-
cent interview only those who meet the minimum legal requirements, twenty percent
only interview applicants who are selected for final review, and three percent of com-
missions do not interview any candidates. MARTIN, supra note 60, at 11-12.
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task in evaluating candidates.  Finding ways to do this effectively is
of the utmost importance.
Diversity and Nondiscrimination
One frequent concern, often expressed by those who worry
about commission composition, is the extent to which nominating
commissioners advance the cause of diversity on the bench.156
Commissions, although not representative of the community as a
whole, need to represent the citizens of the state when making ap-
pointments to the bench and may want to explicitly consider diver-
sity in doing so.  Seven of the thirty-two states using nominating
commissions have statutory provisions that promote diversity in
the composition of the nominating commission.157  In addition,
only eight states include rules that encourage commissioners to
consider a diverse applicant pool by engaging in active recruitment
of applicants from under-represented groups.158  Diversity should
not eclipse merit in commission recommendations, but it can be
easily included in commission rules.  For example, the Utah Judi-
cial Council distributes an instructional packet to all applicants,
which explicitly outlines evaluative criteria and explains the role of
diversity in commission decision-making:
When deciding among applicants whose qualifications appear
in all other respects to be equal, it is relevant to consider the
background and experience of the applicants in relation to the
current composition of the bench for which the appointment is
being made.  The idea is to promote a judiciary of sufficient di-
versity that it can most effectively serve the needs of the
community.159
Perhaps most important when considering the question of diver-
sity is whether commissioners are required to behave in a non-dis-
criminatory manner.  Any discrimination by commissioners clearly
156. Kevin M. Esterling & Seth S. Andersen, Diversity and the Judicial Merit Selec-
tion Process: A Statistical Report, in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 7, 7 (1999).
157. These seven states are: Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Tennessee.  In addition, Indiana’s Lake County Commission in-
cludes a provision that dictates diversity among commissioners. See JUDICIAL MERIT
SELECTION, supra note 9, at 18.
158. The seven states are: Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Rhode
Island, and Utah.  In addition, Indiana’s Lake County Commission includes a diver-
sity provision for applicants. Id. at 18-19.
159. UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE: INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE APPLICANT AND SUMMARY OF THE NOMINATION PROCESS 11, available at
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/forms/apps/judapp/judapp062504.doc (last visited
Feb. 13, 2007).
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harms the process, as it indicates a lack of respect for applicants.
Nonetheless, only ten jurisdictions include any rule against
discrimination.160
Although many commissions may informally weigh the value of
diversity as they consider the applicants, efforts to address the role
of diversity and to ensure that all applicants are treated with cour-
tesy and respect are valuable not only insofar as they help commis-
sioners understand the importance of diversity in decision-making,
but also because they promote public trust and confidence in the
process.
Voting Procedures
Once commissioners have reviewed the applicants’ qualifications
and background, they must determine the list of final recommen-
dations that will be sent to the appointing authority.  Although this
may be accomplished informally and commissioners may reach
consensus, many commissioners find this final step of the commis-
sion’s work a source of frustration and confusion.161  This is partic-
ularly true for new commissioners or those who serve on
commissions with few opportunities to fill vacancies.  Confusion
and frustration can be avoided if the commission has explicit voting
procedures.  Generally, commissions do not have pre-determined
written voting procedures in place.  Procedures vary widely from
commission to commission and, in some cases, a single commission
will use different balloting techniques at different times.162  One
Missouri commissioner described commission voting procedures in
this way:
In reducing the list to the three persons to be submitted to the
Governor, no standard procedure is followed.  Sometimes the
commissioners rank the entire list of names according to their
preferences, using a preferential ballot type of procedure.  At
other times the commissioners each vote for three persons of
their choice.163
Furthermore, although most commissions use a secret ballot,
commissioners, rather than the constitutional or statutory lan-
160. Jurisdictions that include a rule prohibiting discrimination in commission de-
liberations are: Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa (for the magistrate nominating
commission only), Nebraska, Nevada, New York (for most New York nominating
commissions, but not all), Oklahoma, Utah, and Vermont. JUDICIAL MERIT SELEC-
TION, supra note 9, at 18-19.
161. See GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 155.
162. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 57.
163. WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 80, at 103-04.
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guage, usually determine this practice.164  In a few cases, commis-
sioners are required to vote publicly.  In Nebraska, commissioners
are required to take an oral vote as a result of a constitutional
amendment adopted in 1972 following allegations of so-called
“panel-stacking.”165  Alaska adopted open voting in 1967 after all
seven commissioners expressed support for a candidate, but the se-
cret balloting process resulted in only three members voting in
favor of that candidate.166
The degree to which commission voting procedures are specified
in writing varies widely.  In at least eleven of the thirty-two states
that use commission-based appointment, there are no written vot-
ing procedures and commissions have complete discretion to deter-
mine how they ultimately come to a decision about which
applicants will be recommended to the appointing authority.167
Among those states that have written voting procedures, Iowa,168
Nebraska, and Rhode Island have developed the most extensive
provisions.169
V. FINDING A SET OF BEST PRACTICES
If commission-based appointment is to be successful, considera-
ble attention needs to be paid to developing the procedures that
govern commission deliberations and decision-making at every
stage of the process.  Standardized operating procedures can en-
hance public confidence in the process and ensure that commission
recommendations are based on consistent, fair, and responsible
evaluation of applicants.  Understanding commission procedures
and fostering good decision-making practices can help guarantee
164. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 58.
165. “Panel-stacking” is described by Watson and Downing as “any form of panel
selection wherein the nominating commission, through the choice of a particular com-
bination of nominees, seeks to preempt the appointing function, or where the com-
mission accedes to the governor’s express wishes by nominating the person he desires
to appoint.” WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 80, at 103.
166. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 1, at 157.
167. This is based upon a review of commission voting procedures collected as part
of the Judicial Selection in the States Project. See generally THE AM. JUDICATURE
SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES (unpublished, on file with The American
Judicature Society).
168. Individual commissions develop their procedures, based in large part upon the
HANDBOOK FOR IOWA JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS developed by the Su-
preme Court Council on Judicial Selection.  The Iowa recommendations include a
detailed explanation of voting procedures that are effective. See GREENSTEIN &
SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 154-55.
169. These provisions are not included here, but are available in GREENSTEIN &
SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 163-66.
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that the goals of commission-based appointment are achieved.  To
that end, this final part is devoted to recommendations for what a
set of best practices might look like.170
First, it is of paramount importance that the rules and proce-
dures for nominating commissions be committed to written lan-
guage, outlining not only the membership and the ultimate goals of
the commission, but indicating the process by which commissioners
will evaluate applicants, including conflict of interest provisions,
ethical guidelines, deliberative procedures, voting methods, and
confidentiality provisions—in short, how the pickers will pick.
Written provisions specifying procedural rules will not only help
the public understand the process, but will guarantee that appli-
cants understand how the commission makes decisions.
Furthermore, new members should be introduced to the rules
and procedures upon joining the commission.  Although commis-
sion work may appear to be straightforward, new commissioners
will be unfamiliar with the practices (both formal and informal)
used by the commission.  New lay members may also feel intimi-
dated by the legal community and can benefit from the opportunity
to learn about the process from existing commissioners who can
explain the responsibilities and operation of the commission.  This
can be accomplished in two ways.  First, commissioners may be re-
quired to attend regular training workshops where they are en-
couraged to get to know other commissioners and spend time
thinking about and developing commission procedures.  Arizona
currently holds workshops for judicial nominating commissioners,
as required by state statute:
The Chair shall call at least one meeting each year of all Com-
missioners for the following purposes:
Orienting Commissioners about Commission procedures and
purposes as stated in Rule 1 and a Commissioner’s role in ac-
complishing that purpose.
Reviewing commission action during the preceding year in-
cluding information about nominees and appointees and statisti-
cal information about applications, nominations and
appointments relative to the constitutional goal of diversity and
such other matters as the Commission deems appropriate.  Such
statistics shall be compiled from information obtained in the
applications.
170. The best resource for those who hope to improve commission decision-making
is Greenstein and Sampson’s HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION-
ERS. See generally GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107.
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Educating Commissioners about means of improving the judi-
cial nominating process through presentations by knowledgea-
ble individuals and representatives of community
organizations.171
To better educate commissioners and the public about the nomi-
nating process, commissions can also hold an organizational meet-
ing that is open to the public.172  This meeting can serve as a means
to educate commissioners about their ethical responsibilities, to es-
tablish uniform procedures that will guide the commission’s work,
and to anticipate some of the problems that may lie ahead.173  Dur-
ing this organizational meeting, the chair may outline the legal ob-
ligations of the commission, the ethical standards that will govern
the commissioners, the procedures that will be used, the method of
record-keeping that will be used, the rules of confidentiality that
are in place, the evaluative criteria that will be applied during com-
mission decision-making, the methods that will be employed for
investigating applicants’ backgrounds, the interview process, and
commission voting procedures.174  Provided this meeting is open to
the public, it can also serve as a way for the public to gain insight
into the process and learn about the commissioners and the role
they play in the judicial system.
Although most commissions do not have explicit rules governing
confidentiality of information collected about the applicants, each
commission should have specific written policies that will deter-
mine what information will be used during the evaluation process
and the extent to which applicants’ files are available to the public.
The state may opt to include these provisions in the statutory or
constitutional language, but may also require each commission to
establish these rules at their own discretion.  If commissions are
allowed discretion to adopt their own rules of confidentiality, there
is a tendency to craft broad waivers that applicants must sign, thus
allowing the commission a nearly unlimited right to obtain infor-
mation about the applicants.175  Similarly, commissions with the
discretion to craft their own rules will often opt to keep commis-
sion proceedings entirely confidential, thereby limiting public
knowledge of the process and the applicants.  This limits accounta-
171. AZ. UNIF. R. P. FOR COMM’NS ON APP. & T. CT. APPOINTMENTS Rule 5.
172. GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 32-33.
173. Id. at 33-34.
174. Id. at 35-37.
175. Narrowly crafted waivers, however, will generally be more acceptable to po-
tential applicants and therefore will increase the pool of applicants. Id. at 19.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ106.txt unknown Seq: 37  5-APR-07 7:35
2007] HOW THE PICKERS PICK 199
bility and can undermine the public’s confidence in the process.
Finally, if commissions are allowed to create their own rules, there
is a risk that standards for confidentiality may differ dramatically
among commissions, even within a single state.  For all of these
reasons, it is beneficial to include confidentiality rules in state law
both to ensure effective implementation and guarantee uniformity
of confidentiality rules.  Uniform provisions established by state
law provide the added benefit of creating systematic accountability
insofar as they codify the commissioners’ responsibility to act in a
way that is consistent with legislative intentions.
Just as confidentiality provisions should be committed to writing
and every effort should be made to guarantee that commissioners
are applying them consistently across the state, rules governing
ethical conduct and conflicts of interest should be adopted on a
statewide basis and codified into law.176  To encourage commission
ethics, states can require commissioners to take an oath of office.177
Although oaths of office are rarely employed for nominating com-
missioners,178 they emphasize the importance of professional con-
duct and help create a culture of responsibility and accountability.
Similarly, states should develop a code of ethical conduct that gov-
erns the behavior of commissioners and promotes public accounta-
bility.  The code of ethical conduct should also explicitly include
provisions governing conflicts of interest and how commissioners
are expected to act when conflicts arise.
Conflict of interest rules should be comprehensive, and should
include unambiguous definitions of what constitutes a conflict of
interest, the responsibility of the commissioner to disclose a con-
flict when it occurs (and to whom the commissioner shall disclose
the information), and the ramifications of a conflict of interest (i.e.
if a conflict exists, will a commissioner still be allowed to partici-
pate in interviews with other applicants for the same position?).  In
addition, conflict of interest provisions should include mechanisms
to force a commissioner to recuse herself if other commissioners
perceive a conflict of interest and methods to provide accountabil-
ity should a commissioner fail to report a conflict of interest or
recuse herself in a situation where a conflict exists.  This accounta-
176. Id. at 4-5.
177. Id. at 5.
178. Currently nine states and one jurisdiction in Colorado require commissioners
to take an oath of office upon joining the nominating commission. JUDICIAL MERIT
SELECTION, supra note 9, at 18.
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bility could take many forms, but would most likely include a sepa-
rate board that would review allegations or complaints.179
As commissioners receive applications and proceed to collect
background information on each candidate, written rules regarding
the applicant questionnaire, the scope and methods of investiga-
tion, and the procedure to determine which applicants will be inter-
viewed will help promote effective and fair deliberations.180
Applicants need to be aware of the process, and commissioners
need to establish norms of procedure that will be used for all appli-
cants.  Although nearly all commissions currently solicit informa-
tion from standardized candidate questionnaires,181 investigation
techniques and sources of information used in the evaluation of
applicants vary widely.182  Applicants will generally feel more com-
fortable participating in a screening process that is narrow in focus;
this will also require commissioners to think carefully about the
relative value of information gleaned from tax records, law en-
forcement records, bar association polls, judicial disciplinary bodies
or bar disciplinary bodies, professional colleagues, and individuals
within the community, among other sources of information, to de-
termine what information is most useful in assessing the applicant’s
suitability for judicial service.183  To facilitate fair and efficient con-
sideration of applicants, commissioners should establish a standard
set of sources and a standard set of questions that will be used in
the investigation stage, while still recognizing that they may en-
counter unusual circumstances that will necessitate the collection
of additional information.184  Furthermore, commissioners should
set up uniform methods of obtaining information that will be used
for all applicants and should set up a timeline for the investigatory
process.185
Once the investigation is complete, commissioners need to
screen applicants to determine who will be interviewed.  In some
179. Just as states have a body that reviews ethical complaints against judges under
the state Code of Judicial Conduct or have state bar associations that assess ethical
complaints against lawyers in their jurisdiction, this board would be responsible for
implementing the ethical rules established for commissioners.  In addition, states
could create an advisory board that offers advice to commissioners unsure about
whether a conflict exists in a certain situation, analogous to state judicial campaign
conduct commissions for judicial candidates.
180. GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 105-10.
181. MARTIN, supra note 60, at 52-56.
182. Id. at 61-62.
183. GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 108.
184. Id. at 109.
185. Id.
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cases, the commission is required to interview all “qualified appli-
cants,” but most states give the commission discretion to determine
how many interviews to conduct.186  For obvious reasons, a greater
number of interviews usually means that each interview will be
shorter and therefore will offer less opportunity to get to know the
applicant.  Previous commission experience can assist in finding a
balance in selecting applicants to interview and help facilitate a
process that allows commissioners enough time to make the inter-
view useful.187  To avoid the appearance of impropriety, the inter-
view schedule should be random and each interview should be
conducted by the full commission.188  Questions should be com-
posed in advance and every applicant should be asked the same
questions by designated commissioners.189  In writing interview
questions, care needs to be taken to avoid issue-based or politically
charged questions, to give the applicant an adequate opportunity
to volunteer information,190 and to phrase questions in a way that
will generate meaningful responses.191  Finally, thorough prepara-
tion for the interview process will include discussion among com-
missioners to determine how they will deal with difficult
interviews, inappropriate questions, or comments.  Preparation
also includes developing individually tailored questions to address
any concerns that have arisen during the screening and investiga-
tion stages.192
Once the interviews have been completed, commissioners need
to determine which applicants will be recommended to the ap-
pointing authority.  During these final deliberations, commission-
ers should be free to speak candidly and openly about their
186. MARTIN, supra note 60, at 12.  Despite this discretion, conversations with com-
missioners indicate that many commissions have established a norm of interviewing
all candidates who apply.  In an extreme example, this has led to fifteen minute inter-
views with each applicant in one state. Id.
187. GREENSTEIN & SAMPSON, supra note 107, at 110.
188. Id. at 132.
189. Id. at 133.
190. Open-ended questions give applicants a better chance to explain their ap-
proach to legal questions and will yield more useful information.  Commissioners re-
port that a common frustration is the interview where the interviewer talks too much.
One commissioner advises that “if you talk more than 15% of the time you are not
conducting a competent interview.  The interviewee, the candidate, should talk 85%
of the time.”  The American Judicature Society recommends that commissioners also
include a question that allows the applicant to add any additional relevant informa-
tion. Id.
191. Id. at 133-34.
192. Id. at 133-36.
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assessments, both positive and negative.193  To facilitate a frank ex-
change of ideas, most commissions meet in closed session.194  The
chair of the commission, while overseeing this discussion, should
make sure that all commissioners have an opportunity to speak and
that no one commissioner dominates the conversation.  Following
deliberations, the commission’s vote should be conducted accord-
ing to pre-established procedures.  The American Judicature Soci-
ety recommends a successive majority voting method because it
increases the chances that the result will be decisive.195
Nominating commissions should be governed by well-designed
and well-documented processes as they play a fundamental role in
creating and maintaining a fair and impartial judiciary that inspires
public trust and confidence.  At the very least, state policy-makers
should carefully consider not only the membership of nominating
commissions, but the procedures that are used to make commission
decisions.  Taken as a whole, a well-structured process will not only
make the commissioners’ job more efficient and more effective,
but will ensure that commission-based appointment systems are
able to fulfill their role with a minimum of confusion, frustration,
distrust, or impropriety.  If we seek to develop a commission-based
appointment system that will achieve the lofty goals we have set,
we must recognize the importance of institutional operating proce-
dures and the ways that they can structure decision-making.  Good
processes will yield good decision-making, and working to imple-
ment the best set of procedures will serve us well as an investment
in the future of our state judiciaries.
193. Id. at 154.
194. Id.
195. Iowa recommends a successive majority method, and Nevada and Rhode Is-
land have both adopted the practice. Id. at 156-57.
